Do we want to help our allies stay as safe as they can be, and help democracies stay as free as they can be? Do we want to safeguard our own security? Do we want to stay on top as the world’s dominant superpower?
For me, after decades covering both the dividends and the drawbacks of American foreign policy, those are the fundamental questions behind virtually every foreign policy decision our nation has to make. And the answers, for me, are yes, because if we stop, we cede our influence to another superpower, which in most cases these days means China. If we do that, ultimately we and our allies end up living with their priorities, their principles, not ours.
So, when deciding which nations to reinforce and which to resist, the United States often has to choose between the lesser of evils, or put another way, we have to weigh risks against rewards, sometimes even setting aside moral or ideological concerns that we’d like to embrace. The word for that is realpolitik, a German word that means “the politics of reality.” For us, it’s based on the calculation that if there’s a vacuum and we don’t fill it, someone else will.
In the past year-and-a-half, Ukraine, although it wasn’t a model of democracy, has been the most obvious example of realpolitik.
The greater evil is a Russian victory that leaves behind a subjugated population in Ukraine and could then lead to an expansionist Russia moving against other Western allies in Eastern Europe. The lesser evil is the enormous expense of reinforcing Ukraine in its fight for survival. But it’s a cost worth bearing because a weakened Europe means a weakened America.
Another example of realpolitik, where we weigh risks against rewards, is in our continued support for democratic Taiwan. Either we remain committed to its independence and do what we can within the scope of our treaties to reinforce its defense, or Beijing, which consistently names Taiwan as its Number One priority to reclaim, exploits the opening and conquers a small nation that is, if left on its own, outmanned and outgunned. If that happens, it all but cedes the South China Sea, through which up to a third of the world’s commerce sails, to China.
Now, in the Middle East, we face another realpolitik challenge, and it is fraught with decades of hostility. Unlike Ukraine and Taiwan, where at least there are fairly commonly defined good guys and bad guys, this new challenge is to help forge a formal tie between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Many would argue that the good guys and the bad guys are obvious here too, but the difference is, we’re not choosing sides so that one can defeat the other, we’re choosing sides to help bring them closer, which is not just in America’s interest but the world’s.
The odds aren’t perfect but it could happen. There are signs that President Biden has decided to go all-in on becoming the glue for a formal peace agreement. And that would require concessions to the Saudis. We’re talking about an Arab nation that has backed terrorists, that has aggravated Western energy costs, that killed Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, that spawned most of the militants who caused the carnage of 9/11. It is a nation that Joe Biden pledged during his run for the presidency to “make them in fact the pariah that they are.”
But the needs of realpolitik supersede all that. When he spoke to the U.N. last week, the president sent a signal when he talked about the benefits for other nations of burying long hostile relationships with Israel.
Even more telling, when he met with Israeli prime minister Netanyahu on the sidelines of the General Assembly, Biden told Netanyahu, “If you and I, ten years ago, were talking about normalization with Saudi Arabia, I think we’d look at each other like, ‘Who’s been drinking what?’”
Given the Saudis’ background of belligerence, the question is valid. Saudi Arabia has long said that it will never talk about relations with Israel until the Palestinians have their own state. Crown prince Mohammed bin Salman even asserted at an Arab League summit just last month, “The Palestinian cause was, and still is, the pivotal issue for Arabs and Muslims. It comes at the top of the kingdom’s foreign policy priorities.” And yet, apparently it’s not, because in all the analyses of a potential treaty, the Palestinians are not the key ingredients. It is a sign that what I saw in the years I covered the Middle East hasn’t changed: whenever the Palestinian issue becomes explosive, Arab leaders talk the talk about promising to put all their political power into helping them…. but rarely walk the walk. At best for the Palestinians, if Saudi Arabia and Israel do tie a knot, the Saudis might use their leverage to make Palestinians’ lives better, if not to help build a Palestinian nation.
Toward that end, Saudi Arabia just announced last month that it is adding “the State of Palestine” to the portfolio of its ambassador to Jordan.
However, while it comes with potential risks that should not be underestimated, a multi-nation treaty carries more potential rewards. For Saudi Arabia, there’s the possibility of an American defense guarantee, and even more important to the Saudis, the prospect of an American-assisted nuclear program to face off, they say, against the Iranians. For Israel, the most globally important Arab nation joins an alliance for a stronger front against both nations’ adversary, Iran, while as a side benefit to today’s Israeli government, a Palestinian state falls off the table as the Arab world’s most insistent demand— the Israeli foreign minister said on Sunday, “The Palestinian issue is not the main issue within the talks.” For the U.S., on top of helping to defuse tensions all over the region, it would fortify our friendship with Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, and a more codified relationship with Saudi Arabia could impair the inroads China has been making there.
A three-way treaty would dramatically realign the politics and relationships in the Middle East, but the knot will not be easily tied. In Saudi Arabia, polls show a big majority of citizens opposed to making peace until the Palestinians have their own state. In Israel, there is fear that if a nuclear program becomes a part of any deal, the entire region could turn into a tinderbox. And in the U.S., any new pact to enhance the Saudis’ defense would take the approval of two-thirds of the Senate and these days, a resolution to honor Mother Teresa would have trouble getting that much support.
U.S. presidents have tried, dating back to Richard Nixon, to work with Israel to create a Palestinian state. I covered some of those efforts. But although some came closer than others, all ultimately failed.
But peace between nations whose hostility once seemed intractable? As Biden said, “Who’s been drinking what?” It is realpolitik that made it possible. For Saudi Arabia, for Israel, and, since it’s one way to stay on top as the world’s dominant superpower, for the United States.
Over more than five decades Greg Dobbs has been a correspondent for two television networks including ABC News, a political columnist for The Denver Post and syndicated columnist for Scripps newspapers, a moderator on Rocky Mountain PBS, and author of two books, including one about the life of a foreign correspondent called “Life in the Wrong Lane.” He has covered presidencies, politics, and the U.S. space program at home, and wars, natural disasters, and other crises around the globe, from Afghanistan to South Africa, from Iran to Egypt, from the Soviet Union to Saudi Arabia, from Nicaragua to Namibia, from Vietnam to Venezuela, from Libya to Liberia, from Panama to Poland. Dobbs has won three Emmys, the Distinguished Service Award from the Society of Professional Journalists, and as a 37-year resident of Colorado, a place in the Denver Press Club Hall of Fame.
Thanks Greg. Great piece. I am sympathetic to Tom Friedman’s urging that tnis deal gives Saudi too much--- but real politic wins out for ma.